Two bids of identical value- whether it is a Cartelisation


Last updated: 14 January 2023

Court :
Competition Commission of India Competition Act, 2002

Brief :
The Commission notes that the bid rigging is defined in explanation under Section 3(3)(d) of the Act as, any agreement, between enterprises or persons engaged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services, which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding. 

Citation :
Directorate General Ordnance Service (Appellant) vs. Sankeshwar Synthetics Pvt. Ltd (Respondent) 

Directorate General Ordnance Service (Appellant) vs. Sankeshwar Synthetics Pvt. Ltd (Respondent) 
Competition Commission of India Competition Act, 2002
Dated: 20/05/2021 

BRIEF FACTS

1. The Informant in the present case had issued RFP for procurement of under pant Woollen for 9, 95,073 pairs. 

2. The Informant has stated that out of 12 firms which participated, only 7 firms could qualify for opening of commercial bids. 

3. The Informant submits that postopening of commercial bids, it was observed that the rate quoted by two firms may have been quoted after collusion. 

4. The Informant has stated that it is opined that firms have colluded and quoted same rate, it gives an impression that the rates offered are through cartelisation. 

DECISION

DISMISSED.

REASONS

i)  The Commission notes that the bid rigging is defined in explanation under Section 3(3)(d) of the Act as, any agreement, between enterprises or persons engaged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services, which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding. 

ii)  The Commission observes that bid rigging or collusive bidding in a tender can be done by unscrupulous bidders in myriad ways, including clandestine arrangements to submit identical bid or deciding inter se as to who shall submit lowest bid amongst them or who shall refrain from submitting a bid and even includes designation of bid winners in advance on rotational basis/ geographical basis or on customer allocation basis.

iii)  Any such agreement is clearly in contravention of Section 3(3)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act. 

iv)  The Commission notes that in the additional information it came to light that the case was retendered by Informant based on its assessment that two L-1 firms quoted identical rates  which was deemed as cartelisation. 

v)  As per the additional information, the tender was retracted on 16.09.2020 and retendered on 12.11.2020. 

vi)  The Commission observes upon consideration of the minutes of the meeting of Technical Evaluation Committee that the procurer has raised this suspicion of bid-rigging only based on identical rates. Further, such bid has been negotiated with other firms and the procurer has found 5 firms willing to supply the order at the reduced rate of Rs. 127.90/-. Additionally, it is seen that only two tenders were floated in last 5 years for procurement of woollen underpants. The earlier tender was floated on 02.07.2017 for procurement of 16,54,618 pairs of underpants woollen wherein 23 firms had participated. From list of 23 firms participated in earlier tender, the Commission notes that OPs in the present case had also participated in that tender. The OP-2 in the present matter, had in the previous tender submitted a bid of Rs. 142.40 and was the L4 bidder, and OP-1 had also participated, but did not attain any ranking. 

vii)  However, in the present tender both these firms have submitted the bid price of Rs. 127.90 which is much lower than the rate at which the previous tender was awarded. Further, 5 other firms were found willing to supply the order at reduced rate of Rs. 127.90/-. However, the tender was cancelled, and the procurer retendered for the supply of the item. 

viii)  Based on information available at the disposal, the Commission notes that other than mere existence of an identical L-1 rate there is no other evidence to buttress the allegations of collusion or suggest any inter se relationship between the Opposite Parties. 

ix) The Commission observes that the mere existence of price parallelism or identical prices is not per se sufficient to hold the parties liable for act of manipulation of bids/ bid rigging. 

x) The Commission holds that price parallelism has to be accompanied by some plus factor in order to substantiate the presence of ‘collusion’/ or ‘any agreement’ on part of the bidders which still stands unsubstantiated even after seeking additional information. 

xi)  Thus, the Commission observes that the information available at present is insufficient to proceed forward with this matter.

Footnotes

SECTION 3 IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

Anti-competitive agreements. —

(1) No enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons shall enter into any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India.

(2) Any agreement entered into in contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) shall be void.

(3) Any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises or persons or associations of persons or between any person and enterprise or practice carried on, or decision taken by, any association of enterprises or association of persons, including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services, which—

(a) directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices;

(b) limits or controls production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services;

(c) shares the market or source of production or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar way;

(d) directly or indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding, shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any agreement entered into by way of joint ventures if such agreement increases efficiency in production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services. 

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "bid rigging" means any agreement, between enterprises or persons referred to in sub-section (3) engaged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services, which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding.

(4) Any agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different stages or levels of the production chain in different markets, in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services, including—

(a) tie-in arrangement;
(b) exclusive supply agreement;
(c) exclusive distribution agreement;
(d) refusal to deal;
(e) resale price maintenance, shall be an agreement in contravention of sub-section (1) if such agreement causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. 

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—

(a) "tie-in arrangements" includes any agreement requiring a purchaser of goods, as a condition of such purchase, to purchase some other goods;
(b) "exclusive supply agreement" includes any agreement restricting in any manner the purchaser in the course of his trade from acquiring or otherwise dealing in any goods other than those of the seller or any other person;
(c) "exclusive distribution agreement" includes any agreement to limit, restrict or withhold the output or supply of any goods or allocate any area or market for the disposal or sale of the goods;
(d) "refusal to deal" includes any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict, by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold or from whom goods are bought;
(e) "resale price maintenance" includes any agreement to sell goods on condition that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be the prices stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those prices may be charged.

(5) Nothing contained in this section shall restrict—

(i) the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights which have been or may be conferred upon him under:

(a) the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957);
(b) the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970);
(c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999);
(d) the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (48 of 1999);
(e) the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000);
(f) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000 (37 of 2000);

(ii) the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent to which the agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services for such export.

 
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