Court :
Madras HC
Brief :
Citation :
THE substantial questions before the High
Court were, Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal was right
1. in law in not considering the Explanation 2 to Section 147
which provides that the assessing officer can reopen the assessments
even if the assessments have not been completed under Section 143
and only intimation had been sent, if the conditions laid under
Section 147 are fulfilled?
2. in not considering that the addition of incentive bonus to the
total income is proper or not in view of the decision of the Madras
High Court reported in the case of CIT Vs. E.A.Rajendran in which it
has been held that no deduction except what has been allowed under
Section 16 is admissible?"
The facts:
The assessee is a Development Officer in Life Insurance Corporation
of India. He filed his Return of income for the assessment year on
30.03.1999 declaring a total income of Rs.3,94,820/ -. The Return was
processed under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act on 15.03.2000.
The assessee has received additional conveyance allowance of
Rs.1,66,957/ - and claimed the entire additional conveyance exempt
under Section 10(14) of the Act. The assessee has also received
incentive bonus of Rs.5,46,721/ - and claimed expenditure to the tune
of Rs.2,61,849/ - against that income. Later, the Assessing Officer
issued notice under Section 148 of the Act on the ground that the
income has escaped assessment. The assessee replied to the notice
issued under Section 148 and contended that the Assessing Officer
has no jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings when the
Return is pending. However, the Assessing Officer rejecting the
contention of the assessee, completed the assessment under Section
143(3) r/w 147 of the Act. Aggrieved by the order, the assessee
filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The
C.I.T.(A) allowed the appeal. Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal
to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which dismissed the appeal and
confirmed the order of the C.I.T.(A).
Now the Revenue is in appeal before the High Court.
The High Court observed,
1. The Assessing Officer issued notice under Section 148 on
15.03.2000 when a valid Return under Section 139(4) was pending.
2. In this case the Return was filed and the same is pending,
which means that the proceeding is still pending.
3. In such a situation, the Revenue could not have issued
notice for the purpose of reopening under Section 147 of the Act.
In the case of Trustees Of H.E.H. The Nizam's Supplemental Family
Trust Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, the Supreme Court considered
the scope of reopening the assessment and held as follows:
"It is settled law that unless the return of income already filed is
disposed of, notice for reassessment under section 148 cannot be
issued, i.e., no reassessment proceedings can be initiated so long
as assessment proceedings pending on the basis of the return already
filed are not terminated. According to the Revenue it is immaterial
whether the order is communicated or not and the only bar to the
reassessment proceedings is that proceedings on the return already
filed should have been terminated."
".... A mere glance at this note would show that it could not be
said that the Income-tax Officer gave finality to the refund since
no refund is granted either in the hands of the trust or in the
hands of the beneficiaries. It is an inconclusive note where the
Income-tax Officer left the matter at the stage of consideration
even with regard to refund in the hands of the beneficiaries. This
note was also not communicated to the trustees. When we examine the
note dated November 10, 1965, on the file of 1963-64 nothing flows
from that as well. In any case if it is an order, it would be
appealable under section 249 of the Act. Since the period of
limitation starts from the date of intimation of such an order, it
is imperative that such an order be communicated to the assessee.
Had the Income-tax Officer passed any final order, it would have
been communicated to the assessee within a reasonable period. In any
case, what we find is that the note dated November 10, 1965, is
merely an internal endorsement on the file without there being an
indication if the refund application has been finally rejected. By
merely recording that in his opinion, no credit for tax deducted at
source is to be allowed, the Income-tax Officer cannot be said to
have closed the proceedings finally. The decisions referred to by
the Revenue are of no help in the present case. We are, thus, of the
opinion that during the pendency of the return filed under section
139 of the Act along with the refund application under section 237
of the Act, action could not have been taken under section 147/148
of the Act. Our answer to the question, therefore, is in the
negative, i.e., against the Revenue."
In the case of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Vs. Assistant Director of
Income-tax, the Delhi High Court, following the above Supreme Court
judgment, considered the scope of provision of Sections 139 and 147
of the Act and held as follows:
"Applying this line of decisions to the facts of the present case,
the inescapable conclusion that would have to be reached is that
while assessment proceedings remain inchoate, no "fresh evidence or
material" could possibly be unearthed. If any such material or
evidence is available, there would be no restrictions or constraints
on its being taken into consideration by the Assessing Officer for
framing the then current assessment. If the assessment is not framed
before the expiry of the period of limitation for a particular
assessment year, it would have to be assumed that since proceedings
had not been opened under section 143(2), the return had been
accepted as correct. It may be argued that thereafter recourse could
be taken to section 147, provided fresh material had been received
by the Assessing Officer after the expiry of limitation fixed for
framing the original assessment. So far as the present case is
concerned, we are of the view that it is evident that, faced with
severe paucity of time, the Assessing Officer had attempted to
travel the path of section 147 in the vain attempt to enlarge the
time available for framing the assessment. This is not permissible
in law."
Applying the principles enunciated in the judgments of the Supreme
Court as well as the Delhi High Court, cited above, the High Court
held that the Tribunal is right in coming to a conclusion that no
action could be initiated under Section 147 of the Act, when there
is a pendency of the Return before the Assessing Officer.
The reasons given by the Tribunal are based on valid materials and
evidence and the High Court did not find any error or illegality in
the order of the Tribunal so as to warrant interference.
So the High Court held that no substantial questions of law arise
for consideration.