Court :
Supreme Court of India
Brief :
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Citation :
W.P. (CIVIL) 4149/2015 ANU MALHOTRA, J. [DECIDED ON 15/06/2018]
ANSAL PROPERTIES & INDUSTRIES LTD V. NEELAM BHUTANI [DEL] W.P. (CIVIL) 4149/2015 ANU MALHOTRA, J. [DECIDED ON 15/06/2018]
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
SECTION 33 IN THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947
Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. -
(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall--
(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.
(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman],--
(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman:
Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute--
(a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or
(b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub- section, a" protected workman", in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being 1 a member of the executive or other office bearer] of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf.
(4) In every establishment, the number of workmen to be recognised as protected workmen for the purposes of sub-section (3) shall be one per cent. of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the appropriate Government may make rules providing for the distribution of such protected workmen among various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which the workmen may be chosen and recognised as protected workmen.
(5) Where an employer makes an application to a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to sub- section (2) for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of such application, such order in relation thereto as it deems fit:
Provided that where any such authority considers it necessary or expedient so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as it may think fit: Provided further that no proceedings before any such authority shall lapse merely on the ground that any period specified in this sub-section had expired without such proceedings being completed.
1. The petitioner- has assailed the order of the Labour Court, whereby the petitioner herein was directed to reinstate the work woman back on duty along with full back wages and continuity of services within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of the award failing which it had been directed that the Management would be liable to pay the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum till the actual payment .
2. It was allowed to the extent that the work woman was held entitled to increment of 10 per cent for every year in her total salary, taking her basic salary to be Rs. 10,850/-; HRA Rs. 2,300/-; conveyance allowance Rs. 1,200/- and medical one-month basic salary per annum and LTC to its one-month basic salary per annum as part back wages and was further held entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in terms of award from the date 16.06.2010 till the date of actual payment of Rs. 9,73,310/- inasmuch as the management had been directed to comply with the award within a period of 30 days from the publication thereof which had not been so complied with by the Management and apart from the same the Management was also directed to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the workmen towards the cost of litigation.
Partly allowed.
Thus, reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner/management on the verdict in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak & Anr, (1995) 1 SCC 235 with specific reference to the observations in Para 12 of the said verdict is misplaced in as much as the observations in Para 12 of the said verdict relied upon, whereby appeals therein against the invocation of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been allowed, it is essential to observe that in that case the claim of the respondents/workmen was to the effect that they were all daily rated/ casual workers and they were seeking wages to be paid to them on the same rate as the regular workers and the said aspect had not earlier been settled by adjudication and recognition by the employer and thus the stage of computation of that benefit could not have been said to have reached and in that particular case, the claim of the workman of equal pay for equal work was disputed and thus without adjudication of the dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim.
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The verdict of this Court relied upon equally on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the respondent in Piara Lal v. Lt. Governor & Ors, 2001 (1) L.L.N. 235, makes it apparently clear that the powers under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 could have been invoked by the respondent in the facts and circumstances of the instant case to the extent that she claimed increments, DA and revision in pay scales as was granted to 408 PP-MCS other employees from time to time in the category of the respondent and would fall within the ambit of the claims to which the respondent would be entitled to claim having been directed to be reinstated back on duty thus to continue in service along with full back wages vide the award.
Thus, the impugned order, to the extent that it permits the entitlement of full back wages w.e.f. 16.06.2001 onwards, i.e., to the tune of Rs.1,02,713/- and qua increment to the tune of Rs.13,88,711.52/- and the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the said amount from 16.06.2001 till the date of actual payment of Rs. 1822262.52/- with the cost of litigation to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- to the respondent/ work woman in terms of provisions of Section 11(7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is upheld.
However, as regards the claim for LTC for the years 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10 qua LTC and Medical reimbursement as granted vide impugned order, without adjudication of the entitlement of the petitioner for reimbursement in relation thereto without it being proved on record as to whether the respondent had undertaken any travel in a particular year for the claim for the LTC and qua the respondent having incurred expenses in availing medical facilities for claiming medical reimbursement, cannot be upheld and is set aside with the matter being remanded to the Labour Commissioner, Delhi to give an opportunity to both the parties to give their calculations in relation to the LTC claims and for medical reimbursements to ascertain as to what is the money due to which the respondent would be entitled to in relation thereto with the request to Labour Commissioner to undertake the necessary exercise within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order.
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